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H I G H L I G H T S  
 A mechanism was designed for ancillary service provision from P2P energy trading. 
 A continuous double auction was adopted as the P2P energy trading mechanism. 
 A residual balancing mechanism was designed for addressing the unbalance. 
 Optimal bidding strategies of customers in the proposed mechanisms were proposed. 
 The proposed mechanisms are beneficial for individuals, community and power grid.  
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A B S T R A C T   
As an innovative paradigm for electric power systems with a high penetration of distributed energy resources, 
peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading enables direct energy trading between end customers, which is able to facil-
itate local power and energy balance and potentially support the operation of bulk power systems. In this paper, 
a framework was proposed to enable ancillary service provision from a P2P energy trading community, creating 
additional value for both customers in the community and power systems. Specifically, an ancillary service 
provision mechanism was designed along with P2P energy trading and residual balancing mechanisms to enable 
the power utility to obtain ancillary service from customers in a P2P energy trading community. Furthermore, 
the optimal bidding strategy of customers was figured out to maximize their benefits in the proposed mecha-
nisms. Simulation studies were conducted based on a residential community in Great Britain. The results show 
that the proposed ancillary service mechanism can enable the power utility to obtain a significant or required 
amount of ancillary services of different types. The proposed mechanisms and optimal bidding strategy can 
achieve Pareto improvement for the revenue of each customer and result in significantly higher social welfare for 
the whole community. It is also revealed that increasing ancillary service prices and installation rate of electric 
vehicles can increase the total amount of ancillary service provision and thus bring higher revenue for the 
customers in the community. By contrast, increasing installation of PV systems does not necessarily increase the 
amount of service provision.   
1. Introduction 
Conventional electric power systems are characterized by central-
ized management and unidirectional power flow. From the perspective 
of power flow, a vast majority of electricity is generated by centralized 
large generators, transmitted through transmission and distribution 
networks, and finally distributed to end users. From the perspective of 
capital flow in deregulated electricity markets, electricity retailers buy 
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electricity in large quantities from the wholesale market and then sell it 
in small quantities to customers in the retail market [1]. As a result, the 
capital flows from customers to electricity retailers, who further 
distribute the revenues among transmission system operators (TSOs), 
distribution network operators (DNOs) and generators [2]. 
However, the increasing penetration of distributed energy resources 
(DERs) at the demand side of power systems is changing the conven-
tional way in which power systems are operated. From the technical 
point of view, bi-directional power flow brought by DERs, as well as the 
intermittency and randomness resulting from renewable power gener-
ation, will pose challenges on the planning, operation and protection of 
power systems [3]. From the market point of view, the conventional 
retail market is no longer fit-for-purpose [4], and innovative market 
schemes need to be studied to better coordinate and provide incentives 
for DERs to utilize their flexibility to deal with the technical challenges 
brought by DERs themselves [5]. 
In this context, peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has been proposed 
in recent years and is being developing fast across the globe. P2P energy 
trading enables prosumers and consumers at the demand side of power 
systems to directly trade energy with each other and balance power 
locally. P2P energy trading has the potential to bring higher economic 
benefits for customers and facilitate better local power and energy bal-
ance for power systems [6]. 
There has been a sharp increase in the number of academic studies in 
the area of P2P energy trading. A number of studies have been con-
ducted from the perspectives of market design, trading platform, 
communication infrastructure, policy making and social science. For 
market design, there are both centralized designs, such as the ‘Flexi 
User’ and ‘Pool Hub’ proposed in [7], the ‘Smart electricity Exchange 
Platform (STEP)’ in [8] and ‘Energy Cost Optimization via Trade (ECO- 
Trade)’ in [9]; and decentralized designs, such as the ‘bilateral contract 
networks’ in [5], the ‘multi-bilateral economic dispatch (MBED) ’ in 
[10] and the ‘blockchain electricity trading with demurrage’ in [11]. For 
the platforms that underpin P2P energy trading, both centralized plat-
form, such as the ‘ElecBay’ proposed in [6], and blockchain-based 
decentralized platforms, such as those in [12–15], have been pro-
posed. Regarding the electricity infrastructure supporting P2P energy 
trading, as reviewed in [16], a number of studies have been made 
recently, such as the involvement of distribution locational marginal 
pricing in P2P energy trading, as those in [17–19]. For the communi-
cation infrastructure, Zhang et al. investigated the requirements of 
communication infrastructures for the bidding and control systems for 
P2P energy trading [20]. Jogunola et al. conducted a comparative 
analysis of P2P communication architectures for P2P energy trading, 
with both structured and unstructured P2P protocols evaluated [21]. For 
policy making, Diestelmeier et al. identified the major policy implica-
tions for the electricity law of European Union, considering the shift of 
the role of electricity consumers with blockchain technology, which is 
closely related and widely applicable to P2P energy trading [22]. 
Finally, some researchers have conducted studies on P2P energy trading 
from the perspective of social science. Examples include ‘in-kind’ and 
‘intangible’ returns in P2P energy trading [23], customers’ preference 
on ‘autarky’ and ‘autonomy’ [24] and rational-economic and positive 
reinforcement properties of P2P energy trading [25]. Some recent 
studies also modelled and analyzed the cooperation between customers 
in P2P energy trading based on motivational psychology [26,27]. 
Industrial companies have also shown great interest in P2P energy 
trading, and a number of projects have been planned or started. One 
example is the Brooklyn Microgrid project in New York, USA, where an 
Ethereum-based blockchain platform is used to support P2P energy 
trading, with smart contracts for conducting the trading and generating 
the tokens for energy transaction [28]. Similar projects are being con-
ducted in many other countries, such as those in Netherland [29], 
Denmark [29], France [30], Germany [29], UK [31,32], Japan [33], 
New Zealand [34], Australia [35], Romania [29] and Slovenia [36]. 
Although there are a rapidly increasing number of academic studies 
and industrial projects on P2P energy trading, most existing work fo-
cuses on enabling and facilitating local energy trading itself, but not on 
manipulating the way of P2P energy trading to make the participants to 
provide ancillary services to support the operation of power systems. In 
some studies such as [6], [37] and [38], it is revealed that P2P energy 
trading can facilitate local balance of power and energy and reduce the 
peak loads, thus potentially being beneficial to the power systems. 
However, these potential benefits shouldn’t be treated as a ‘by-product’ 
of conducting P2P energy trading. Instead this should be designed in a 
systematic way to contribute to the power system operation. 
As proposed by T. Morstyn et al. in [39], self-organizing prosumers in 
P2P energy trading can further provide ancillary services for power 
systems. This concept is termed as ‘federated power plant’, which has 
the potential to ‘address social, institutional and economic issues faced 
by top-down strategies for coordinating virtual power plants, while 
unlocking additional value for P2P energy trading’ [39]. Although this 
concept has been proposed, there has been few solid studies depicting 
how to realize this in detail. The study in this paper aims to make the 
first attempt in this direction, through designing a framework for 
ancillary service provision from a P2P energy trading community. The 
framework is composed of three mechanisms, i.e. P2P energy trading 
mechanism, residual balancing mechanism and ancillary service provi-
sion mechanism. 
The key research questions to be addressed in the paper are:  
1) How does a power utility obtain ancillary service from customers in a 
P2P energy trading community?  
2) What should customers do to maximize their benefits, when 
participating in P2P energy trading and ancillary service provision at 
the same time?  
3) What are the outcomes when customers participate in P2P energy 
trading and ancillary service provision at the same time? Are they 
better or worse off? 
To address the first question, an ancillary service provision mecha-
nism was designed along with P2P energy trading and residual 
balancing mechanisms. To address the second question, the optimal 
bidding strategy of customers in the proposed ancillary service mecha-
nism was figured out. Case study was conducted, and the simulation 
results verify the proposed methods and show the outcomes in terms of 
the benefits of customers, which addresses the third research question. 
It is worth noting that ancillary service is a broad concept, which 
includes a wide range of services with various time scales (e.g. seconds, 
minutes, hours and even longer) and various purposes (e.g. frequency 
response, operating reserve, voltage support, constraint management, 
and peak shaving / valley filling). Ancillary services can be provided by 
the resources at both the supply and demand sides, and when at the 
demand side, ancillary services are usually provided through demand 
response. The ancillary services considered in this paper are those that 
can be provided through generation/demand increase/reduction from 
demand-side peer-to-peer energy trading communities, with the time 
scales ranging from several minutes to several hours. The ancillary 
services considered in this paper have some level of generality, because 
they cover a range of time scales and are not associated with specific 
purposes (e.g. they can be used for voltage support, operating reserve 
and peak shaving as long as the time scales fit). However, there are also 
some other ancillary services that have not been covered in this paper, 
such as frequency response with a second-by-second time scale, which 
are future research topics. 
It is also worth noting that the characteristics and roles of customers 
at the demand side of electric power systems have changed with the 
connection of distributed generators and energy storage systems. For 
customers without any distributed generators, they are still conven-
tional consumers. However, for customers with distributed generators, 
they can play different roles in electric power systems at different time 
periods, either being producers or consumers, depending on whether the 
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onsite generation can fully satisfy the demand. Therefore, customers 
with distributed generators are widely referred to as ‘prosumers’ in 
many existing studies. In this paper, in the P2P energy trading mecha-
nism, prosumers (who act as producers) directly sell their surplus gen-
eration to consumers or other prosumers (who act as consumers). In the 
ancillary service mechanism, both prosumers and consumers can pro-
vide ancillary services for the power utility. For providing ancillary 
services, consumers can increase/decrease their power consumption, 
while prosumers can increase/decrease their power generation or con-
sumption. In this paper, we use the general term ‘customers’, which can 
include both prosumers and consumers. 
2. Methodological framework 
In this paper, a framework for ancillary service provision from a P2P 
energy trading community is presented. The overall framework and the 
associated timeline are illustrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed framework is composed of three 
mechanisms, which are executed sequentially across the timeline as 
shown in Fig. 2. Firstly, the CDA mechanism (shown as the green dotted 
circle) acts as the P2P energy trading mechanism, where the customers 
in the community reach P2P energy trading agreements with each other. 
However, not all the generation / electricity demands are matched in the 
community, and the residual generation/demand will be balanced by 
the power utility in the proposed residual balancing mechanism (shown 
as the yellow dashed circle). After that, in the ancillary service mecha-
nism (shown as the red dashed circle) the power utility will assess its 
operational needs and issue incentive signals for obtaining ancillary 
services, and the customers will respond to the signals by submitting 
bids for providing ancillary services based on the consideration of 
maximizing their respective economic benefits. The power utility will 
then assess the bids and make purchase decisions. It is worth noting that 
the agreements reached in the CDA and residual balancing mechanisms 
need to be adjusted for providing ancillary services. 
Without loss of generality, the power utility is assumed to play the 
roles of both power system operator and electricity supplier/retailer, as 
the fact in many parts of the world (e.g. many places in the U.S. and 
China). By contrast, in some other parts of the world (e.g. the UK and 
some other places in the U.S. and China), the roles of power system 
operator and electricity supplier/retailer are played by separate com-
panies. In this case, the proposed framework is still applicable, but the 
roles played by the united power utility will be played by separate 
companies. For example, the ‘residual balancing’ can be provided by the 
electricity supplier/retailer company and the ancillary services can be 
provided for the power system operator. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the P2P energy trading, residual balancing and 
ancillary service mechanisms studied in this paper are all forward 
markets. The associated real-time markets and the settlement process 
considering the uncertainties of renewable power generation and 
customer behaviors are not within the scope of this paper. As shown in 
Fig. 2, for a future period of time, e.g. one day (shown as the ‘Target 
Time Period T’), the agreements for P2P energy trading, residual 
balancing and ancillary services can be made as much as Tad in advance, 
from the ‘Gate Opening’ time to the ‘Gate Closure’ time. The time pe-
riods allowing to make these agreements are called ‘Agreement Periods’ 
in this paper, and it is noted that the Agreement Periods for P2P energy 
trading, residual balancing and ancillary services come in sequence 
throughout the timeline. 
Note that the three mechanisms proposed in this paper are operated 
one after one in sequence, which may lead to some level of sub- 
optimality from the whole system perspective. For example, in the 
wholesale markets in some countries, the energy and ancillary service 
markets are operated and cleared simultaneously, so that the power 
system operator and market participants are able to optimize their de-
cisions considering the energy transaction and ancillary service provi-
sion at the same time. This paper made the first attempt to design an 
ancillary service mechanism along with P2P energy trading, but whether 
the mechanisms proposed could achieve the global optimum in terms of 
resource allocation remains to be further studied. 
It is also an open question whether the energy market should be 
operated and cleared with the ancillary service market simultaneously. 
Operating energy and ancillary service markets simultaneously may 
increase the market complexity, and sometimes there are some non- 
technical reasons, e.g. the institutions in the power industry, which 
may have an impact. For example, in reality in Great Britain, the power 
system operator (i.e. the National Grid Electricity System Operator) 
purchases different types of ancillary services through different routes 
(e.g. electronic tendering or direct bilateral contracts), being separate 
from the wholesale market. Furthermore, again setting the example in 
Great Britain, ancillary services may be purchased by different inde-
pendent parties (e.g. the power system operator, distribution network 
operator or electricity suppliers), so it is difficult to operate a united 
market incorporating both energy and various ancillary service markets. 
In this sense, separate design of energy and ancillary service markets is 
more flexible and easier to modify and add on. 
3. P2P energy trading mechanism and customers’ bidding 
strategy 
In this section, the P2P energy trading mechanism studied in this 
paper, i.e. the CDA mechanism, will be presented. The customers’ bid-
ding strategy in the CDA will also be described. Note that the work of 
this section is a combination of several existing methods (including the 
CDA in [40], optimization of customers’ operational schedules [37] and 
bidding strategy [41]), without original innovation in each single 
method. However, the combination itself has some value, and further-
more, the work described in this section is the basis for the residual 
balancing and ancillary service mechanisms originally proposed later. 
3.1. Continuous double auction mechanism 
The CDA mechanism matches buyers and sellers who are interested 
in trading and is deemed as a highly efficient mechanism. It is widely 
used in the trading of various types of commodities, such as stocks as 
well as electricity. Recently, there have been a number of studies pro-
posing to adopt CDA for P2P energy trading, such as those in [42–45]. In 
this paper, the CDA described in [40] is adopted as the mechanism for 
P2P energy trading. 
Fig. 1. The methodological framework for ancillary service provision from a 
P2P energy trading community. 
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As presented in Section 2, customers trade energy with each other to 
reach P2P energy trading agreements by participating in the CDA 
mechanism. For any time slot t in the Target Time Period T, in the 
corresponding Agreement Period of CDA, customers submit bids or asks 
according to their roles being ‘buyers’ (who have electricity deficit at t) 
or ‘sellers’ (who have electricity surplus at t). A bid, which is submitted 
by a buyer, is represented by ob,t (bt, πb,t, σb,t, τb,t), which means that the 
buyer bt would like to by the σb,t (kWh) amount of electricity at the price 
πb,t (£/kWh), and the bid arrives at the ‘exchange’ at the time τb,t. Note 
that the exchange is a centralized or decentralized platform set for P2P 
energy trading within the community. Similarly, an ask, which is sub-
mitted by a seller is represented by os,t(st, πs,t, σs,t, τs,t). 
Within the Agreement Period of CDA, bids and asks will arrive at the 
exchange asynchronously. After they arrive, the bids and asks are allo-
cated in ‘order books’. Note that for the bids and asks associated with 
each time slot t in the Target Time Period T, there is one order book. In 
each order book, the bids are sorted in the descending order of the bid 
prices πb,t and the asks are sorted in the ascending order of the ask prices 
πs,t. For both bids and asks, if several ones have the same prices, they are 
sorted based on the arrival time - the later a bid/ask arrives, the lower it 
ranks. 
Every time a bid/ask arrives at the exchange, it will be allocated in 
the corresponding order book based on the above-described principles, 
and then the exchange will try to match the bids and asks in the order 
book. If the following relationship is satisfied for a bid ob,t and an ask os,t: 
πb;t  πs;t; (1) 
then the following amount of electricity will be matched: 
σmatched;t  min
 
σb;t; σs;t

(2) 
The trading price for the matched amount of electricity will be 
decided as 
πt 
πb;t  πs;t
2 : (3) 
The bid/ask that is fully matched will be removed from the order 
book, and the bid/ask that is not fully matched will be updated by 
o’b;t 
 
bt; πb;t; σ’b;t; τb;t

if σb;t   σs;t > 0; (4)  
o’s;t 
 
st; πs;t; σ’s;t; τs;t

if σb;t   σs;t < 0; (5)  
where 
σ’b;t  σb;t   σs;t; (6)  
σ’s;t  σs;t   σb;t: (7) 
The matching process will go from the top to the bottom of the order 
book, and will end once no matching can be made. The matching process 
will be triggered every time a new bid/ask arrives. When an amount of 
demand and generation, σmatched,t (kWh), is matched at the price πt 
(£/kWh), a P2P energy trading agreement, <σmatched,t, πt>, is estab-
lished between the corresponding buyer and seller, specifying the 
quantity and price to be traded. 
The process of CDA is summarized in Appendix A. 
3.2. Bidding strategy of customers in the P2P energy trading mechanism 
Bidding strategies of customers need to be studied to describe cus-
tomers behaviors in the proposed P2P energy trading mechanism and 
therefore the performance and outcome of the mechanism can be 
evaluated. 
First of all, each customer optimizes its operational schedule of en-
ergy storage and flexible loads to minimize the electricity cost, consid-
ering the availability of onsite generation and time-varying electricity 
prices. The abstract formulation of the optimization problem is pre-
sented as follows: 
min
XT
t1pt

NLi;t

Δt; (8)  
s.t. 
NLi;t 
XN
j1xj;t; (9)  
f x  0; (10)  
gx  0; (11)  
x⊆X: (12) 
In Equation (8), pt (£/kWh) is the electricity price, which may take 
different values for importing and exporting electricity; NLi,t (kW) is the 
net load of the customer i at the time step t. Equation (9) calculates NLi,t 
by taking the sum of electricity consumption (positive values) and 
generation (negative values) of all the devices in the customer’s premise 
at the time step t, where N represents the total number of devices in the 
premise and j is the device index. Equations (10) and (11) are the 
equality and inequality constraints about the device characteristics and 
customer comfort. Equation (12) specifies the range of decision vari-
ables. Detailed formulation refers to the Appendix, which is based on 
[37]. 
By solving the optimization problem, each customer (usually 
through home energy management systems), indexed by i, is able to 
obtain the operational schedules, and thus obtain the net load profile 
throughout the Target Time Period T, denoted as NL*i  {NL*i;t | t  1,2, 
…, T} where NL*i;t > 0 represents that the premise imports electricity 
from the power utility while NL*i;t < 0 represents that the premise exports 
surplus generation to the power utility. 
As proposed in [40], the customers decide the amount of electricity 
to be sold/bought in the P2P energy trading mechanism based on their 
net load profiles. For any time slot t, a customer will submit a bid with 
Fig. 2. The timeline for ancillary service provision from a P2P energy trading community.  
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the amount of electricity to be bought being NL*i;t, if NL
*
i;t > 0. Similarly, 
the customer will submit an ask with the amount of electricity to be sold 
being 


NL*i;t


, if NL*i;t < 0. 
The bid/ask prices are assumed to be made given the assumption that 
the customers act as ‘zero intelligent plus (ZIP)’ traders [41]. The 
assumption of ZIP traders can well mimic the behaviors of human 
traders in stock markets. As a ZIP trader, each customer will set a budget 
constraint, [pFiTt ,p
retail
t ] to ensure that it will not be worse off by 
participating in the P2P energy trading compared to trading with the 
power utility. Initially, for each customer, the price for its bid/ask is 
decided uniformly at random within the budget constraint. During the 
double auction process, the customers will dynamically adjust their bid/ 
ask prices based on matching results of previous bids/asks. 
Specifically, the bidding strategy of customers in the P2P energy 
trading mechanism is presented in Appendix B. 
After running the CDA, a number of P2P energy trading agreements 
will be made between customers. In an abstract form, the set of P2P 
energy trading agreements regarding the customer i for the time slot t, 
AGRTP2Pi;t , is marked as 
AGRTP2Pi;t 
n
AGRTP2Pij;t jj 2 J
o
8t 2 T; i 2 I: (13)  
where AGRTP2Pij;t represents the P2P energy trading agreement between 
the customers i and j for the time slot t, which specifies the amount, price 
and direction (i.e. buying or selling) of the energy trading. J is the set of 
customers that have P2P energy trading agreements with the customer i. 
In summary, each customer decides its bid in the P2P energy trading 
mechanism in two steps. In the first step, the customer solves the opti-
mization problem, formulated by Formulas (8)–(12), to obtain the load 
schedule, so that the amount of electricity to be sold/bought in the P2P 
energy trading mechanism can be decided. The electricity prices used in 
Formula (8) are just the retail prices / feed-in tariff rates offered by the 
power utility. In the second step, the customer decides the price of its 
electricity to be sold/bought in the P2P energy trading mechanism 
following the rules assuming that it is a ZIP trader. 
It is worth noting that this bidding strategy is not optimal for the 
customers, due to two reasons. First, in the P2P energy trading mecha-
nism, what finally decides the bill of a customer is the prices specified in 
the P2P energy trading agreements, rather than the electricity prices 
offered by the power utility used in Formula (8). Second, the customers 
decide the amount of electricity to be sold/bought and the bid/ask price 
in two separate steps rather than jointly at one step. We adopted this 
strategy from [40] , which is feasible although not optimal. How to 
propose a better (even optimal) bidding strategy in the CDA-based P2P 
energy trading mechanism remains to be studied, but it is not the focus 
of this paper, which is to enable ancillary service provision from a peer- 
to-peer energy trading community. 
4. Residual balancing mechanism 
As presented in Section 3, during the Agreement Period of CDA, a 
number of P2P energy trading agreements will be made between cus-
tomers for the time slots in the Target Time Period T. Nevertheless, it is 
highly possible that there are still several bids and/or asks in the order 
book, which are not matched due to their prices are not matched with 
each other. In the original design in [40], the corresponding amount of 
demand and/or generation will be curtailed. However, this design will 
raise the risks of demand/generation curtailment for customers, and 
thus may hinder some of them from participating in the P2P energy 
trading in the first place. 
In order to address this concern, in this paper, an alternative residual 
balancing mechanism is proposed, in which the electricity demand of 
the un-matched bids in the CDA is set to be fully supplied by the power 
utility, and the generation of the un-matched asks in the CDA is also set 
to be fully purchased by the power utility. That is, the power utility will 
act as the ‘residual balancer’ for the P2P energy trading community. 
Furthermore, in this paper, it is assumed that the power utility supplies 
the residual demand at the electricity retail price pretailt (£/kWh) and 
purchases the residual generation at the Feed-in Tariff (FiT) rate pFiTt 
(£/kWh), given the assumption that the entire P2P energy trading 
community acts as a ‘price taker’ in the electricity wholesale market so 
that the power utility can treat the P2P energy trading community as a 
normal customer. This assumption is basically true at the moment, when 
the number and scale of P2P energy trading communities are still very 
small in the whole power system. If P2P energy trading communities can 
no longer be taken as price takers in the future, their interaction with the 
wholesale market needs to be taken into consideration by the power 
utility, as discussed in [5] and [46], but this is not the focus of this paper. 
In summary, in the Agreement Period of the residual balancing 
mechanism, for the time slots in the Target Time Period T, additional 
peer-to-grid (P2G) residual balancing agreements will be made between 
customers and the power utility, so that the electricity surplus/deficit of 
customers, which are not purchased/supplied in the CDA, can be 
balanced by the utility. 
In an abstract form, the set of P2G residual balancing agreements 
regarding the customer i throughout the Target Time Period T, 
AGRTP2Gi , is marked as 
AGRTP2Gi 
n
AGRTP2Gi;t jt 2 T
o
8i 2 I (14)  
where AGRTP2Gi;t represents the P2G residual balancing agreement be-
tween the customer i and the power utility for the time slot t, which 
specifies the amount, price and direction (i.e. buying or selling) of the 
energy flow for residual balancing. 
5. Ancillary service mechanism and optimal bidding strategy of 
customers 
In this section, the mechanism for customers in the P2P energy 
trading community to provide ancillary services for the power utility 
will be proposed. The corresponding optimal bidding strategy of cus-
tomers will also be presented. 
5.1. Ancillary service mechanism 
After the Agreement Periods of CDA and residual balancing mecha-
nisms, the P2P energy trading agreements between customers and the 
P2G residual balancing agreements between customers and the power 
utility have been fixed. These agreements will be made available for the 
power utility as the basis for it to assess its schedules for operating power 
systems. 
Based on the results of the assessment, the power utility may foresee 
some operational problems such as over voltage or congestions in the 
power networks. Moreover, the power utility may identify some possible 
actions that may improve the operational economy and security of 
power systems, such as peak shaving. In these circumstances, the power 
utility is able to procure ancillary services from customers in the P2P 
energy trading community to help the operation of power systems. The 
specific mechanism is presented as follows. 
5.1.1. Categories of ancillary services 
In a general sense, ancillary services can refer to any services and 
functions provided to power utilities that ‘facilitate and support the 
continuous flow of electricity so that supply will continually meet de-
mand’ [47]. There are a wide range of ancillary services for different 
purposes and with different time resolutions. For example, according to 
the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), ancillary ser-
vices include 1) scheduling, system control and dispatch, 2) reactive 
power supply and voltage control from generation sources, 3) regulation 
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and frequency response, 4) energy imbalance service, 5) operating 
reserve – spinning reserve, and 6) operating reserve – supplemental 
reserve services [48]. For another example, in the UK, the National Grid 
Electricity System Operator procures more than 30 types of ancillary 
services [47]. 
In this paper, two general categories of ancillary services are 
considered to be procured by the power utility, of which the time res-
olution can range from several minutes to several hours. The two cate-
gories of ancillary services considered are 1) demand reduction / 
generation increase (named as ‘Type-1 AS’), and 2) demand increase / 
generation reduction (named as ‘Type-2 AS’). Note that the generation 
increase/reduction and demand increase/reduction refer to the change 
of the net load of a customer as a whole, rather than the change of power 
output/consumption of specific appliances or devices within the cus-
tomer’s premise. 
5.1.2. Procurement process 
In this paper, a bidding process is designed to be used for the power 
utility to procure ancillary services from the customers in the P2P energy 
trading community. The whole bidding process will be conducted during 
the Agreement Period for Ancillary Service Mechanism as shown in 
Fig. 2. The specific steps are presented as follows. 
Step 1 Publication of the demand and prices for ancillary services by 
the power utility 
As the first step, based on the assessment of the future operational 
status of power systems, the power utility will broadcast the total de-
mand and prices of ancillary services to all the customers in the P2P 
energy trading community: 
DAS 

DASt jt 2 T
	
; (15)  
pAS 

pASt jt 2 T
	
; (16)  
where DAS is the set of the magnitude (kW) of the ancillary services 
required for the time slots within the Target Time Period T, and pAS is 
the set of prices (£/kW/h) that the power utility is willing to pay for the 
ancillary services provided by the customers. The power utility will also 
specify the type of ancillary services needed (either ‘Type-1 AS’ or ‘Type- 
2 AS’). Note that how the power utility decides DAS and pAS involves 
comprehensive analysis of the power systems managed by the power 
utility, which is out of the scope of this paper. 
Step 2 Bidding from the customers in the P2P energy trading 
community 
After receiving the demand and prices of ancillary services required 
by the power utility as described in Step 1, the customers will run 
optimization and submit their bids to the power utility. A bid is in the 
form of 
BASi 
n
bASi;t jt 2 T
o
8i 2 I*⊆I; (17)  
where BASi is the bid of customer i for providing ancillary services for the 
Target Time Period T, and bASi;t is the magnitude (kW) of the service that 
the customer would like to provide for the time slot t. I* is the set of the 
customers who submit the bids. 
Note that the bids only include the amount of services to be provided. 
In the design of this paper, the prices of the services are fixed by the 
utility as published in Step 1. 
Details about how a customer makes the optimal bid will be pre-
sented in Section 5.2. 
Step 3 Decision on the service procurement by the power utility 
After collecting the bids from the customers in the P2P energy 
trading community (a time window can be defined in the Agreement 
Period for this purpose), the power utility needs to decide which of and 
to what extent the bids are to be accepted/declined. To achieve the 
fairness, the power utility in principle should distribute the amount of 
services to be procured averagely on the customers who have submitted 
the bids. However, the amount of services to be procured from each 
customer (called as the ‘quota’) calculated in this way may be higher 
than some customers’ bids, and thus the surplus quotas can be given to 
other customers in need. With the above considerations, the process 
detailed in Fig. 3 is proposed for the power utility to decide the amount 
of services to be procured from the customers. 
5.1.3. Adjustment of P2P energy trading and P2G residual balancing 
agreements 
The ancillary services to be provided by the customers are measured 
by taking the net load profiles calculated in Section 3.2 as the baseline. 
To provide ancillary services (either generation increase/decrease or 
demand increase/decrease), the customer’s actual net load profile will 
deviate from that calculated in Section 3.2. However, the net load pro-
files calculated in Section 3.2 have been agreed to be satisfied by other 
customers through the P2P energy trading agreements made in the CDA 
and/or by the power utility through the P2G residual balancing agree-
ments made in the residual balancing mechanism. The deviation of the 
net load profiles for providing ancillary services will inevitably result in 
the breach of pre-made P2P energy trading agreements and/or P2G re-
sidual balancing agreements. 
Therefore, after the power utility makes the procurement decisions 
and reaches ancillary service agreements with customers, some further 
arrangements need to be made to address the conflicts between the 
newly made ancillary service agreements and the pre-made P2P energy 
trading and/or P2G residual balancing agreements. The principles of the 
arrangements are summarized in Table 1. 
The application and mathematical representation of these principles 
Fig. 3. Distribution of the ancillary service procurement among customers.  
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will be presented in the Section 5.2.1 followed. 
5.2. Optimal bidding strategy of customers in the ancillary service 
mechanism 
5.2.1. Cost and benefit analysis 
Customers decide whether and to what extent to participate in the 
ancillary service mechanism by weighing the associated benefit and 
cost. Therefore, a cost and benefit analysis is conducted for customers to 
provide different types of ancillary services in the proposed mechanism. 
Cost and benefit analysis for Type-1 AS 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the magnitude of Type-1 
AS procured from a customer i for the time slot t is qi,t (kW), as decided 
through the procedure shown in Fig. 3. Recall that the Type-1 AS refers 
to the demand reduction or generation increase of the customer i as a 
whole, which is measured with the baseline being the net load profile of 
the customer, NL*i;t , calculated in Section 3.2. 
First of all, because of the provision of the ancillary service, the 
customer will receive reward from the power utility, as presented in 
Section 5.1.2. The associated benefit, ΔBASqi;t , is expressed as 
ΔBASqi;t  p
AS
t ∙qi;t 8i 2 I
*; t 2 T: (23) 
If NL*i;t < 0, to provide Type-1 AS, the customer needs to export 
more electricity, as much as qi,t. As specified in Section 5.1.3, the power 
utility will purchase all the qi,t at the Feed-in Tariff rate. Therefore, the 
customer will receive extra benefit, ΔBEXPqi;t (£), as calculated by 
ΔBEXPqi;t  p
FiT
t ∙qi;t∙Δt 8i 2 I*; t 2 T when NL*i;t  0: (24) 
If NL*i;t > 0, qi,t can be divided into two parts, i.e. 
qi;t  q
’
i;t  q
’’
i;t 8i 2 I
*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0; (25)  
where 
q’i;t 
(
qi;t qi;t  NL*i;t
NL*i;t qi;t > NL
*
i;t
(26)  
q’’i;t 
(
0 qi;t  NL*i;t
qi;t   NL
*
i;t qi;t > NL
*
i;t
(27) 
In Equations (25)–(27), q’i,t (kW) represents the ‘demand reduction 
component’ that decreases the NL*i;t towards 0, while q’’i,t (kW) repre-
sents the ‘generation increase component’ that drives the NL*i;t towards 
to a more negative value (i.e. changing the customer i from a consumer 
to a producer). For example, if it is assumed that NL*i;t  5 kW and qi,t  8 
kW, then q’i,t  5 kW and q’’i,t  3 kW, and the net load of the customer i 
after service provision will become   3 kW (i.e. 5 kW – 8 kW). That is, the 
provision of 8 kW Type-1 AS will change the customer from a consumer 
that imports 5 kW electricity to a producer that exports 3 kW electricity. 
For another example, if it is assumed that NL*i;t  5 kW and qi,t  3 kW, 
then q’i,t  3 kW and q’’i,t  0 kW, and the net load of the customer i after 
service provision will become 2 kW (i.e. 5 kW – 3 kW). That is, the 
provision of 3 kW Type-1 AS will reduce the electricity consumption of 
the customer by 3 kW but will not change the customer from a consumer 
to a producer. 
For the additional electricity generation of the customer, i.e. q’’i,t, 
because of the provision of Type-1 AS, the power utility will purchase it 
at the Feed-in Tariff rate according to Section 5.1.3. Therefore, the 
additional benefit because of this, ΔBEXPq’’i;t (£), is calculated by 
ΔBEXPq’’i;t  p
FiT
t ∙q
’’
i;t∙Δt 8i 2 I*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0: (28) 
For the demand reduction component q’i,t, it can be further divided 
into two parts: 
q’i;t  q
’  I
i;t  q
’’  II
i;t 8i 2 I
*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0; (29)  
where q’  Ii;t (kW) represents the component that is originally supplied by 
other customers through P2P energy trading agreements (denoted as 
q’  Ii;t ~ AGRT
P2P
i;t ), and q
’’  II
i;t (kW) represents the component that is 
originally supplied by the power utility through P2G residual balancing 
agreements (denoted as q’’  IIi;t ~ AGRT
P2G
i;t ). 
For the reduction of the demand which is originally supplied by the 
power utility, i.e. for q’’  IIi;t , no penalty cost needs to be paid by the 
customer for the breach of the P2G residual balancing agreements, ac-
cording to Section 5.1.3. Furthermore, the customer will no longer need 
to pay the electricity cost for the demand that has been reduced. This can 
be seen as a ‘benefit’ and is calculated by 
ΔBREDq’  IIi;t  p
retail
t ∙q
’  II
i;t ∙Δt 8i 2 I*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0 (30) 
For the reduction of the demand which is originally supplied by the 
other customers through P2P energy trading agreements, i.e. for q’  Ii;t , the 
customers need to pay penalty cost to those customers. The q’  Ii;t may be 
originally supplied by multiple P2P energy trading agreements, which is 
expressed by 
q’  Ii;t 
X
g AGRTP2Pi;t
q’  Ii;t;g 8i 2 I
*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0; (31)  
where g represents a P2P energy trading agreement that contributes to 
q’  Ii;t . According to Section 5.1.3, the level of penalty cost equals to the 
revenue loss of the relevant customers who have to directly trade with 
the power utility instead because of the demand reduction. Therefore, 
the penalty cost that needs to be paid by the customer i in this regard is 
expressed as 
ΔCPENq’  Ii;t 
X
g AGRTP2Pi;t
 
πg;t   pFiTt

∙q’  Ii;t;g∙Δt 8i 2 I*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0:
(32) 
Recall that πg is the price specified in the P2P energy trading 
agreement. On the other hand, the reduction of q’  Ii;t makes the customer 
Table 1 
The arrangements for addressing the conflicts among P2P energy trading, P2G residual balancing and ancillary service agreements.  
The change in electricity production/consumption for 
providing ancillary services 
How the change is balanced Agreements 
violated 
Penalty 
More electricity generated Purchased by the power utility at the 
Feed-in Tariff rate 
P2P Yes (Extra payment for compensating the revenue loss 
of relevant customers) 
P2G No 
More electricity consumed Supplied by the power utility at its retail 
price 
P2P Yes (Extra payment for compensating the revenue loss 
of relevant customers) 
P2G No  
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no longer need to pay the relevant electricity cost specified in the rele-
vant P2P energy trading agreements. This can be seen as a sort of 
benefit, and is expressed as 
ΔBREDq’  Ii;t 
X
g AGRTP2Pi;t
πg;t∙q’  Ii;t;g∙Δt 8i 2 I*; t 2 T when NL*i;t > 0: (33) 
Summarizing Equations (23)–(33), the total cost and benefit of the 
customer i who provides qi,t of ancillary service are expressed as 
ΔBqi;t 
8
><
>:
ΔBASqi;t ΔB
EXP
qi;t whenNL
*
i;t  0
ΔBASqi;t ΔB
RED
q’  Ii;t
ΔBREDq’  IIi;t ΔB
EXP
q’’i;t
whenNL*i;t > 0
8i2 I*; t2T
(34)  
ΔCqi;t 
8
<
:
0 whenNL*i;t  0
ΔCPENq’  Ii;t whenNL
*
i;t > 0
8i 2 I*; t 2 T (35)   
Cost and benefit analysis for Type-2 AS 
Similar analysis can be made to calculate the cost and benefit of 
customers in providing Type-2 AS. For simplicity, they are not presented 
in detail in this paper. 
5.2.2. Optimal bidding strategy of customers 
As presented in Section 5.1.2, customers can submit bids on the 
magnitude of ancillary services they would like to provide to the power 
utility, based on the types, demand and prices of the ancillary services 
issued by the power utility. In this paper, it is assumed that customers 
will make the bidding decisions to maximize their economic benefits (i. 
e. minimize their net costs), considering the cost and benefit analysis 
presented in Section 5.2.1. 
Specifically, after the power utility publishes the type, demand and 
prices of ancillary services needed as detailed in Section 5.1.2, a 
customer i will run the following optimization to decide whether / how 
much to bid in the ancillary service mechanism: 
min
X
t2TnT’
pt ∙

NLt   NL*t

∙Δt
X
t2T’

  ΔBbASt ΔCbASt

(36)  
s.t. 
Equations (9)–(12), (34), (35), 
(
NL*t   NLt  b
AS
t if AS  Type-1
NLt   NL*t  b
AS
t if AS  Type-2
8t 2 T’ (37)  
0  bASt  qt (38) 
In the optimization problem, T’ represents the set of time slots for 
which the power utility calls for ancillary service provision; NLt is the 
new net load of the customer to be decided; NL*t is the net load of the 
customer before providing any ancillary service as calculated in Section 
3.2; bASt (kW) represents the bid submitted by the customer to the power 
utility for ancillary service provision; ΔBbASt and ΔCbASt are the benefit and 
cost of ancillary service provision regarding bASt , as calculated by 
Equations (34) and (35); qt represents the quota of ancillary service 
published by the power utility as explained in Section 5.1.2. Note that in 
the presentation of the optimization problem, the subscript i for repre-
senting the customer i is omitted for simplicity. 
In the optimization problem, the operation of flexible devices is re- 
scheduled to have the new net load NLt for reaching the minimum net 
cost, considering the cost and benefit of ancillary service provision. Both 
the time slots within and beyond the time slots when the ancillary ser-
vices are called are considered in the optimization, because the power 
consumption of some devices (e.g. EVs) may be shifted from one time 
slot to another, which may result in the change of net cost both within 
and beyond T’. The decision variables are the operational states of 
flexible devices, which will decide the new net load NLt. 
The objective function of the optimization problem (36) is the 
change of the net cost of customer i throughout the Target Time Period 
T, compared to that without any ancillary service provision as calculated 
by (8). The objective function is composed of the change of the net 
electricity cost beyond T’ (i.e. within T\T’), and the net cost change due 
to ancillary service provision within T’ based on the cost and benefit 
analysis conducted in Section 5.2.1. 
As for the constraints, Equations (9)–(12) are the constraints 
regarding the flexible devices. Equations (34)–(35) are to calculate the 
cost and benefit because of ancillary service provision. Equation (37) 
shows the relationship between the new net load and the bid. It is seen 
that if it is a Type-1 AS, the bid will be a demand reduction or generation 
increase, and similarly, if it is a Type-2 AS, the bid will be a demand 
increase or generation decrease. Equation (38) requires that the bid 
submitted by the customer must be below the quota distributed by the 
power utility. Note that in the ancillary service procurement process as 
presented in Section 5.1.2, the optimization formulated in this section 
will be first run by each customer with setting qt as positive infinity to 
generate the original bids used for Step 2. Then the same optimization 
will be run again by the customers with the qt distributed by the power 
utility (referring to Step III of Fig. 3) to generate the final bids that will 
be procured by the power utility. 
Remarks on deploying the proposed mechanisms in practice 
Note that the bidding processes for P2P energy trading and ancillary 
services involve intensive participation from customers, but residential 
customers may lack sufficient time, knowledge or interest to participate. 
Therefore, the practical deployment of the bidding mechanisms largely 
depends on the deployment of smart metering infrastructure and home 
energy management systems (HEMSs). Smart metering infrastructure 
enables automatic metering with a high time resolution, while HEMSs 
automatically control various appliances in smart homes and intelli-
gently conduct bidding in electricity markets on behalf of customers. 
Customers only need to set their preferences occasionally through the 
interface of HEMSs [49]. As a result, with HEMSs, customers do not have 
to spend a lot of time or be very knowledgeable to participate. In recent 
years, as shown in another review paper of ours [50], there have been a 
rapidly increasing number of academic studies and industrial practice in 
trialing or deploying P2P energy trading within residential 
communities. 
6. Case study 
Ancillary service provision from a residential P2P energy trading 
community in Great Britain (GB) was studied to validate and assess the 
proposed mechanisms. The residential community was assumed to 
consist of 20 customers, with each customer equipped with flexible 
appliances and part of customers equipped with onsite PV generation 
and/or electric vehicles. Based on realistic statistics in GB, the CREST 
model [51] was used to generate the number, types and parameters of 
the appliances owned by each customer. As many as 34 types of appli-
ances were included in the CREST model. The CREST model was also 
used to generate the occupancy and usage of appliances of each 
customer. For the customers with onsite PV generation, the CREST 
model was used again to generate the PV generation throughout the day. 
For the customers with electric vehicles, the parameters of electric ve-
hicles and the travelling behaviors of customers were generated by 
randomly sampling from an EV database built on realistic statistics in GB 
[52]. 
In this case study, the length of the Target Time Period T was 
assumed to be as long as one day, before which the proposed P2P energy 
trading mechanism, residual balancing mechanism and ancillary service 
mechanism were executed in order. The length of each time step was 
assumed to be one hour. The simulation was conducted in a MATLAB 
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environment and CPLEX was used to solve the mixed integer linear 
programming problems when needed. 
Six specific cases with three scenarios for each case were designed 
and studied for validating and assessing the proposed mechanisms from 
different perspectives. They are summarized in Tables 2 and 3, with the 
detailed description followed. 
The description of the cases is as follows:  
 Case 1 acts as the base case for verifying and assessing the validity 
and advantage of the mechanisms proposed in this paper, through 
comparing the performance of the three scenarios (S1-S3). It was 
assumed that half of the customers are equipped with onsite PV 
generation, and also half of the customers own electric vehicles. 
Whether a customer has onsite PV generation and electric vehicles 
was decided randomly and independently. The price of ancillary 
service was assumed to be 154.82 £/KW/h (with reference to the 
average remuneration level of the Short Term Operating Reserve 
service in the Great Britain [53]), and the type of ancillary service 
was assumed to be Type-2 AS. It was also assumed that the power 
utility would like to procure ancillary service for 4 h within the 
Target Time Period T (i.e. from 13:00 to 17:00), with no limit on the 
amount of ancillary service (i.e. as much as possible).  
 Case 2 examines the performance of the proposed mechanisms when 
a different type of ancillary service is provided. The settings of Case 2 
were the same as those of Case 1, except that the Type-1 AS was 
considered.  
 Case 3 examines the performance of the proposed mechanisms when 
a limited amount of ancillary service is procured. The settings of Case 
3 were the same as those of Case 1, except that the amount of 
ancillary service procured by the power utility was considered to 
have a limited value, which was 50 kW/h.  
 Case 4 assesses the impact of price levels of ancillary service. The 
settings of Case 4 were the same as those of Case 1, except that a 
range of ancillary service prices were considered.  
 Case 5 assesses the performance of the propose mechanisms with 
different installation rates of electric vehicles. The settings of Case 5 
were the same as those of Case 1, except that different installation 
rates of electric vehicles were considered.  
 Case 6 assesses the performance of the propose mechanisms with 
different installation rates of PV systems. The settings of Case 6 were 
the same as those of Case 1, except that different installation rates of 
PV systems were considered. 
For each case, there scenarios were studied, which are described as 
follows:  
 In Scenario 1 (S1), the customers were assumed to separately trade 
with the power utility at the retail price (when buying electricity) 
and the Feed-in Tariff rate (when selling electricity) in the conven-
tional ‘peer-to-grid (P2G)’ mode.  
 In Scenario 2 (S2), the customers were assumed to trade with each 
other in the proposed P2P energy trading mechanism and with the 
residual balancing mechanism executed, but without the ancillary 
service mechanism executed.  
 In Scenario 3 (S3), the customers were assumed to participate in the 
proposed P2P energy trading mechanism, residual balancing mech-
anism and ancillary service mechanism in order. 
6.1. Case 1: Base case assessing the performance of the proposed 
mechanisms 
As presented in Table 2, this case acts as the base case and consists of 
three scenarios, for validating and assessing the performance of the 
proposed P2P energy trading, residual balancing and ancillary service 
mechanisms. The results are shown in Figs. 4 – 7. 
In Fig. 4, the daily revenues of each customer in the three scenarios 
are illustrated (note that positive revenues mean earning money while 
negative revenues mean paying bills). The blue solid line shows the 
revenue of each customer in the conventional P2G mode (S1), which acts 
as the reference case. The green dashed line with triangles shows the 
revenue of each customer with the proposed P2P energy trading and 
residual balancing mechanisms executed (S2). It is seen that for most 
customers the revenue in S2 is higher than that in the reference P2G 
mode (S1), demonstrating the advantage of the proposed P2P energy 
trading and residual balancing mechanisms. The magenta dotted line 
with circles shows the revenues further with the ancillary service 
mechanism executed (S3). It is seen that for a number of customers (e.g. 
Customers 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15 and 16) their revenues are significantly 
higher than those in both S2 and S1, thanks to the reward in the ancillary 
service mechanism. This demonstrates the benefits of the proposed 
Table 2 
The case design.  
Case Settings 
Price of 
Ancillary 
Service 
Type of 
Ancillary 
Service 
Magnitude 
of Ancillary 
Service 
EV 
Installation 
Rate 
PV 
Installation 
Rate 
1 154.82 
£/KW/h 
Type-2 Unlimited 50% 50% 
2 154.82 
£/KW/h 
Type-1 Unlimited 50% 50% 
3 154.82 
£/KW/h 
Type-2 50 kW/h 50% 50% 
4 (10–150%) 
* 154.82 
£/KW/h 
Type-2 Unlimited 50% 50% 
5 154.82 
£/KW/h 
Type-2 Unlimited 10–100% 50% 
6 154.82 
£/KW/h 
Type-2 Unlimited 50% 10–100%  
Table 3 
The scenario design.*  
Scenarios Mechanisms considered 
P2P Energy Trading Residual Balancing Ancillary Service 
S1 (P2G) N N N 
S2 (P2P) Y Y N 
S3 (P2P  AS) Y Y Y  
* N: No; Y: Yes. 
Fig. 4. The revenues of each customer in Case 1.  
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ancillary service mechanism to customers. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, as shown in Fig. 4, the revenue of 
each customer in S2 is always no lower than that in S1, and further, the 
revenue of each customer in S3 is always no lower than that in S2. This 
demonstrates that the proposed P2P energy trading and residual 
balancing mechanism are able to achieve Pareto improvement for each 
customer compared to the conventional P2G mode, and the proposed 
ancillary service mechanism can further achieve Pareto improvement 
for each customer compared to that without executing it. 
For the overall residential community, as shown in Fig. 5, the social 
welfare (i.e. the total revenues of all the customers in the community) 
with P2P energy trading (S2) is 98% higher than that with the con-
ventional P2G mode (S1). The social welfare further with the proposed 
ancillary service mechanism executed (S3) is 144% higher than that only 
with P2P energy trading (S2) and 194% higher than that with the con-
ventional P2G mode (S1). 
The supply and demand relationship among customers and between 
the customers and the external power grid is illustrated by Sankey dia-
grams as shown in Fig. 6. 
As shown in Fig. 6(a), it is seen that the customers either sell or buy 
electricity to/from the external power grid in the conventional P2G 
mode (S1). By contrast, Fig. 6(b) shows that with the proposed P2P 
energy trading mechanism executed (S2), the demand of all the con-
sumers in the community is changed to be supplied by other customers 
(acting as producers) in the community. It is also seen in Fig. 6(b) that 
the residual surplus generation of the producers will be exported to the 
power grid, demonstrating that the proposed residual balancing mech-
anism works well. Fig. 6(c) shows that, compared to Fig. 6(b), there are a 
lot of customers having been changed from producers to consumers and 
the demand of consumers has increased significantly, due to the provi-
sion of Type-2 AS (which is demand increase / generation reduction). 
The increased amount of demand is satisfied by the external power grid, 
which is consistent with that described in Section 5.1.3. In summary, 
Fig. 6 shows that the proposed P2P energy trading, residual balancing 
and ancillary service mechanisms have functioned in the expected way. 
Fig. 7 illustrates the total amount of ancillary service provided for 
different hours of the day. 
6.2. Case 2: Performance with a different type of ancillary service 
provided 
This case assesses the situation where a different type of ancillary 
service, i.e. Type-1 AS, is provided. The results are presented in 
Figs. 8–10. 
In general, the results presented in Figs. 8–10 show that the validity 
and advantage of the proposed mechanisms still exist in the situation 
where a different type of ancillary service is provided. Specifically, Fig. 8 
demonstrates that the proposed P2P energy trading and balancing re-
sidual mechanisms (S2) are able to achieve Pareto improvement for each 
customer compared to the conventional P2G mode (S1), and the pro-
posed ancillary service mechanism (S3) can further achieve Pareto 
improvement for each customer compared to that without executing it 
(S2). 
Fig. 9 illustrates that the proposed mechanisms are able to result in 
improved social welfare for the overall community. Quantitatively, the 
social welfare with P2P energy trading (S2) is 98% higher than that with 
the conventional P2G mode (S1). The social welfare further with the 
proposed ancillary service mechanism executed (S3) is 85% higher than 
that only with P2P energy trading (S2) and 135% higher than that with 
the conventional P2G mode (S1). It is worth noting that the percentages 
of improvement in this case are lower than those in Case 1. This shows 
that customers might have different levels of flexibility for providing 
different types of ancillary services. 
Fig. 10 illustrates the total amount of Type-1 AS provided for the 
relevant hours, showing that the capability of the customers in the 
community to provide a different type of ancillary service (i.e. Type-1 
AS). 
6.3. Case 3: Ancillary service provision with limited amount 
This case assesses the situation where a limited amount of ancillary 
service (being 50 kW/h) was needed by the power utility. Only one 
scenario, i.e. S3, was simulated in this case. The simulation results are 
shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12. 
In Fig. 11, it is seen that for all the time steps where the ancillary 
service is needed, the total amount of ancillary service provided by the 
community is restrained below the limit 50 kW/h, compared to the 
unlimited case shown in Fig. 7. This demonstrates that the proposed 
procedure shown in Fig. 3 can effectively limit the total amount of 
service below the pre-defined limit. 
Fig. 12 compares the service provision from each customer in the 
situations with and without the total amount limit (50 kW/h). It is seen 
that with the limit, the amount of service of some customers was reduced 
to ensure that the total amount of service would not exceed the limit. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the reduction of the service was 
conducted for the customers providing the largest amount of services, 
guaranteeing the fairness among the customers and thus verifying the 
effectiveness of the proposed service distribution rules as presented in 
Fig. 3. 
6.4. Case 4: The impact of ancillary service prices 
For different levels of ancillary service prices provided by the power 
utility, the customers may make different decisions on whether or not 
and to what extent to provide ancillary service, based on the trade-off 
between the cost and benefit. Therefore, in this case, the performance 
of the proposed mechanisms is assessed given various levels of ancillary 
service prices. The prices range from 10% to 150% of the price in Case 1 
(which is 154.82 £/KW/h based on the remuneration level of the Short 
Term Operating Reserve service in the Great Britain [53], called as 
‘based price’ in the rest of this section) The results are shown in Fig. 13 
and Fig. 14. 
Fig. 13 illustrates the social welfare of the overall community in 
different scenarios with various levels of ancillary service prices. In S1 
and S2, the ancillary service mechanism was not executed so the social 
welfare will not change with the ancillary service prices (shown as the 
blue solid line and the green dashed line with triangles respectively). For 
S3 (shown as the magenta dotted line with circles), the social welfare of 
the community increases with the increase of ancillary service prices. 
The increase of social welfare is almost linear, with an obvious knee 
Fig. 5. The social welfare of the residential community in Case 1.  
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point at 70% of the base price in Case 1. 
Fig. 14 shows the total amount of ancillary service provided by the 
community given various price levels. It is seen that, within 10–60% of 
the base price and 70–150% of the base price, the amount of service 
increases marginally with the increase of service prices. This explains 
the near-linear increase of the social welfare in these two intervals as 
shown in Fig. 13. It is also observed in Fig. 14 that there is a sharp in-
crease of the amount of service provision when the service price in-
creases from 60% to 70% of the base price. This is because the benefit of 
providing ancillary service changes to be higher than the associated cost 
when the service price reaches 70% of the base price, so that a number of 
customers commit to provide ancillary service. The sharp increase of 
service amount also explains the knee point of the social welfare as 
shown in Fig. 13. 
6.5. Case 5: The impact of installation rate of electric vehicles 
Electrification of transportation is one important trend in many 
countries in the world [54]. The increasing number of electric vehicles 
will significantly increase the electric demand, and at the same time 
Fig. 6. The supply and demand relationship for 13:00–14:00 in Case 1.  
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provide potential flexibility with smart charging and vehicle-to-grid 
(V2G) technologies. Therefore, this case assesses the impact of instal-
lation rate of electric vehicles in the community (10–100%) on the 
performance of the proposed mechanisms. The simulation results are 
shown in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. 
In Fig. 15, it is seen that, with increasing installation rate of electric 
vehicles, the social welfare of the whole community decreases in both S1 
(with the conventional P2G mode) and S2 (with the proposed P2P and 
residual balancing mechanisms), because increasing numbers of electric 
vehicles increases the total electric demand of the community. However, 
it is worth noting that the social welfare in S2 is still always higher that 
of S1, demonstrating the advantage of the proposed P2P energy trading 
mechanism. 
The situation with the ancillary service mechanism further executed 
(S3) is more complex. On one hand, as shown in Fig. 16, increasing 
installation rate of electric vehicles will bring increasing amount of 
demand flexibility, and thus the total amount of ancillary service pro-
vided will increase accordingly, also indicating that more reward will be 
obtained by the customers from the power utility due to the ancillary 
service provision. On the other hand, as analyzed previously, increasing 
numbers of electric vehicles will increase the total electric demand and 
thus will incur higher electricity cost as well. Therefore, the overall 
trend of the social welfare with increasing installation rate of electric 
Fig. 7. The total amount of ancillary service provided by the community for 
13:00–17:00 in Case 1. 
Fig. 8. The revenues of each customer in Case 2.  
Fig. 9. The social welfare of the residential community in Case 2.  
Fig. 10. The total amount of ancillary service provided by the community for 
13:00–17:00 in Case 2. 
Fig. 11. The total amount of ancillary service provided by the community for 
13:00–17:00 in Case 3. 
Fig. 12. The ancillary service provision from each customer for 14:00–15:00 
with and without the limits. 
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vehicles is not necessarily monotonical, but depending on comparison 
between the increasing reward due to increasing ancillary service pro-
vision and the increasing cost due to the increasing electric demand, 
shown as the magenta dotted line with circles in Fig. 15. 
6.6. Case 6: The impact of installation rate of PV systems 
This case assesses the performance of the proposed mechanisms 
given various installation rates of PV systems in the community 
(10–100%). The simulation results are shown in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18. 
As shown in Fig. 17, it is seen that, in all the three scenarios (S1 – S3), 
the social welfare of the community increases with the increasing 
installation rate of PV systems. This is because increasing installation 
rate of PV systems increases the amount of local generation, which will 
result in higher revenues no matter the increased generation is 
consumed by customers themselves, sold to other customers or sold to 
the power utility. 
However, as shown in Fig. 18, the increasing installation of PV sys-
tems does not necessarily result in increasing amount (and thus revenue) 
of ancillary service provision, because it does not bring more flexibility 
(in this paper, the PV systems were assumed to always generate the 
maximum power possible and the PV generation curtailment was not 
considered). The amount of service provision given different installation 
rates of PV systems is different, because customers will generate 
Fig. 13. The social welfare of the residential community given different levels 
of ancillary service prices in Case 4. 
Fig. 14. The total amount of ancillary services provided by the community 
during 13:00–17:00 given different levels of ancillary service prices in Case 4. 
Fig. 15. The social welfare of the residential community given various instal-
lation rates of electric vehicles in Case 5. 
Fig. 16. The total amount of ancillary services provided by the community 
during 13:00–17:00 given various installation rates of electric vehicles in 
Case 5. 
Fig. 17. The social welfare of the residential community given various instal-
lation rates of PV systems in Case 6. 
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different appliances schedules before and during the participation in the 
ancillary service mechanism with different amount of local PV genera-
tion available. 
7. Conclusion 
As an innovative paradigm for electric power systems with a high 
penetration of distributed energy resources, P2P energy trading enables 
direct energy trading between end customers, which is able to facilitate 
local power and energy balance and has the potential to support the 
operation of bulk power systems. In this paper, a framework was pro-
posed to enable ancillary service provision from a P2P energy trading 
community, creating additional value for both customers in the com-
munity and power systems. Specifically, an ancillary service provision 
mechanism was designed along with P2P energy trading and residual 
balancing mechanisms to enable the power utility to obtain ancillary 
service from customers in a P2P energy trading community. Further-
more, the optimal bidding strategy of customers was figured out to 
maximize their benefits in the proposed mechanisms. 
Simulation results based on a residential community in Great Britain 
verify the effectiveness and demonstrate the outcomes of the proposed 
mechanisms and bidding strategy. From the perspective of the power 
utility, simulation results show that the power utility was able to obtain 
a significant or required amount of ancillary services of different types 
with the proposed mechanisms applied. From the perspective of each 
individual customer, the proposed P2P energy trading and residual 
balancing mechanisms are able to achieve Pareto improvement 
compared to the conventional Power-to-Grid mode, and the proposed 
ancillary service mechanism can further achieve Pareto improvement 
compared to that without ancillary services. Furthermore, the social 
welfare of the whole community with the proposed P2P energy trading 
and residual balancing mechanism is significantly higher (being 98% in 
the case of this paper) than that with the conventional Power-to-Grid 
mode, and the adoption of ancillary service mechanism can further 
improve the social welfare (by 144% with the Type-2 Ancillary Service 
and by 135% with the Type-1 Ancillary Service in this paper). 
Moreover, simulation results show that increasing ancillary service 
prices and installation rate of electric vehicles (by rescheduling EV 
charging and discharging) can increase the total amount of ancillary 
services provided for the power utility and thus can bring higher reve-
nue for the customers in the community. By contrast, increasing 
installation rate of PV systems is not directly relevant to the amount of 
service provided. 
Although this paper makes a first attempt in ancillary service pro-
vision from a P2P energy trading community, a number of studies 
remain to be conducted in the future, including but not limited to the 
following topics. First of all, all the mechanisms presented in this paper 
are forward markets. The uncertainties of generation and load forecast, 
and the corresponding real-time / settlement mechanisms are to be 
figured out. Moreover, the constraints and costs related to electric power 
networks are to be considered. Last but not the least, more specific types 
of ancillary services remain to be studied, such as frequency control, 
voltage support, etc. 
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Appendix A 
The continuous double auction (CDA) process for customers to reach P2P energy trading agreements is summarized as follows.  
CDA process for customers to reach P2P energy trading agreements 
1: while the current time is within the Agreement Period for CDA 
2: if a bid/ask associated with the time slot t arrives at the exchange 
3: put the bid/ask in the order book t (sorted by the bid/ask price); 
4: for any pair of bid ob,t and ask os,t in the order book t 
5: if πb,t > πs,t 
6: match the following amount of electricity: σmatched,t  min(σb,t, σs,t); 
(continued on next page) 
Fig. 18. The total amount of ancillary services provided by the community 
during 13:00–17:00 given various installation rates of PV systems in Case 6. 
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(continued ) 
CDA process for customers to reach P2P energy trading agreements 
7: make the trading price for the matched electricity: πt  (πb,t  πs,t)/2; 
8: if σb,t > σs,t 
9: modify the bid as o’b,t  ob,t(bt, πb,t, σ’b,t, τb,t) where σ’b,t  σb,t - σs,t; 
10: remove the ask os,t from the order book; 
11: else 
12: modify the ask as o’s,t  os,t(bt, πs,t, σ’s,t, τs,t) where σ’s,t  σs,t - σb,t; 
13: remove the bid ob,t from the order book; 
14: end if 
15: end if 
16: end for 
17: end if 
18: end while  
Appendix B 
The bidding process of customers in the continuous double auction (CDA) process is presented as follows:  
The bidding process of customers in the CDA process 
1: while the current time is within the Agreement Period for CDA 
2: if a bid/ask associated with the time slot t arrives at the exchange 
3: run the CDA process as shown in Appendix A; 
4: for any bid ob,t in the order book t 
5: if the last matching was successfully made at the price πt 
6: if πb,t > πt 
7: πb,t  πb,t  γ⋅(pretailt - πb,t);  
8: end if 
9: if it is an ask that arrived 
10: if πb,t < πt 
11: πb,t  πb,t - γ⋅(πb,t - pFiTt );  
12: end if 
13: end if 
14: else 
15: if it is a bid that arrived 
16: πb,t  πb,t - γ⋅(πb,t - pFiTt );  
17: end if 
18: end if 
19: end for 
20: for any ask os,t in the order book t 
21: if the last matching was successfully made at the price πt 
22: if πs,t < πt 
23: πs,t  πs,t  γ⋅(pretailt – πs,t);  
24: end if 
25: if it is a bid that arrived 
26: if πs,t > πt 
27: πs,t  πs,t - γ⋅(πs,t - pFiTt );  
28: end if 
29: end if 
30: else 
31: if it is an ask that arrived 
32: πs,t  πs,t - γ⋅(πs,t - pFiTt );  
33: end if 
34: end if 
35: end for 
36: end if 
37: end while  
Note that γ is the coefficient for customers to update their bid/ask prices, and its value within (0, 1). 
Appendix C 
The optimization problem solved by each customer to obtain the optimal operational schedule is presented as follows. This operational schedule is 
the basis for each customer to bid in the P2P energy trading mechanism. Each customer is assumed to be equipped with onsite generators (PV panels as 
an example), energy storage systems (electric vehicles as an example) and flexible loads (including non-interruptible loads, interruptible loads and 
thermostatically controlled loads). 
The objective function is to minimize the net electricity cost of the customer’s premise throughout the Target Time Period T, considering the retail 
price and feed-in tariff rate offered by the power utility for now: 
min
XT
t1pt jNLtjΔt (A1)  
where NLt (kW) is the net load of the customer at the time step t, which is expressed as 
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NLt 
 
X
δ2Af
xδ;t
!


xcht
ηch  x
dis
t ηdis

Pmust-runt   PPV;t (A2) 
In Equations (A1) and (A2), T is the total number of time slots within the Target Time Period T; Af refers to the set of flexible loads; xδ (kW) is the 
power of the flexible load; xch (kW) and xdis (kW) are the charging and discharging power of the electric vehicle, and ηch and ηdis represent the charging 
and discharging efficiency; Pmust-run (kW) is the sum of inflexible demand; PPV (kW) is the power output of PV panels; Δt (hour) is the length of each 
time slot. pt (£/kWh) is the electricity prices offered by the power utility: 
pt 
8
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>
><
>
>
>:
pretailt
 
X
δ2Af
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ηch
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
 Pmust-runt   PPV;t  0
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δ2Af
xδ;t
!


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
 Pmust-runt   PPV;t < 0
(A3)  
where the premise sells the electricity at the feed-in tariff rate pFiTt (£/kWh) and buys electricity at the retail price p
retail
t (£/kWh). 
The constraints include the operational constraints of flexible loads and the requirements of customers. Specifically, the constraints regarding non- 
interruptible flexible loads (i.e. δ 2 ANL ⊂ Af) are as follows: 
xδ;t  0 8t 2 1; b [ e;T; δ 2 ANL (A4)  
Xe
tb
xδ;t  LδPδ; (A5)  
XtLδ   1
st
xδ;s 
 
xδ;t   xδ;t  1

⋅Lδ 8t 2 b; e   Lδ  1 (A6)  
xδ;t  f0;Pδg 8t 2 T (A7) 
In Equations (A4)–(A7), b and e represent the allowed start time and required end time of the task respectively; Lδ represents the time duration of 
the task, measured by the number of time slots (note that e – b > Lδ); Pδ (kW) represents the rate power of the appliance. Equation (A4) guarantees 
that the appliance will not operate beyond the permissioned time interval. Equation (A5) requires that the task must be accomplished before the 
deadline. Equation (A6) guarantees that the task cannot be interrupted. Finally, Equation (A7) denotes the possible power status of the appliance. It is 
worth noting that interruptible flexible appliances can be seen as a special type of non-interruptible flexible appliance and can be described by 
Equations (A4), (A5) and (A7) but without (A6). 
The constraints regarding thermostatically controlled loads, i.e. δ 2 ATCL ⊂ Af, are presented as follows (electric water heaters are considered as an 
example in this paper): 
Xt
s1xδ;s⋅Δt ρ⋅M⋅cwater⋅θ0   θlow 
Xt
s1Cs 8t 2 1; T; (A8)  
Xt
s1xδ;s⋅Δt  ρ⋅M⋅cwater⋅
 
θup   θ0


Xt
s1Cs 8t 2 1;T; (A9)  
Ct  ρ⋅di⋅cwater⋅
 
θreq   θen;t

8t 2 1;T; (A10)  
xδ;t  0;Pδ 8t 2 T (A11) 
In Equations (A8)–(A11), ρ represents a constant coefficient for unit conversion between J and kWh; M (kg) represents the mass of water in full 
storage; cwater [J/(kg⋅C)] represents the specific heat of water; θ0 (C), θreq (C) and θen (C) are the initial water temperature, required water 
temperature and cold water temperature respectively; θlow (C) and θup (C) are the lower and upper limits of water temperature; C (kWh) is the heat 
energy demand for hot water use; d (kg) is the amount of hot water drawn. Inequation (A8) requires that the total heat energy gained from the heater 
plus the initial heat energy stored in the tank till the t-th time slot should be no less than the total heat demand till the same time slot. Similarly, 
Inequation (A9) requires that the total heat stored in the tank cannot be over the upper limit. Equation (A10) calculates the heat demand due to hot 
water use. Equation (A11) specifies the range of the heating power. 
The constraints regarding the electric vehicle are shown in (A12)–(A17). It is worth noting that the same set of equations, i.e. (A12)–(A17) can be 
used to model household battery energy storage systems as well by setting tin  tout and ΔSOC  0. 
SOCt  SOC0 
1
E
Xt
s1
 
xcht  x
dis
t

Δt 8t 2 1; tout [ tin; T; (A12)  
SOCtin  SOCtout   ΔSOC; (A13)  
SOCmin  SOCt  SOCmax 8t 2 1; tout [ tin; T; (A14)  
SOC0  SOCT ; (A15)  
0  xcht  Pchmax; (A16)  
Pdismax  x
dis
t  0: (A17) 
In Equations (A12)–(A17), SOC is the state of charge (SOC) of the battery of the electric vehicle; SOC0 represents the initial SOC; E (kWh) represents 
the rated capacity of the battery; tin and tout represent the time slots at which the electric vehicle plugs in and out (i.e. return and leave home); ΔSOC 
represents the energy consumption of the electric vehicle during the travel, measured by SOC; SOCmin and SOCmax represent the lower and upper limits 
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of SOC; Pchmax (kW) and P
dis
max (kW) are the upper limits of charging and discharging power. Equation (A12) calculates the SOC of the battery on the 
electric vehicle at any time slot t. Equations (A13) presents the relationship between the SOC at plug-in time and plug-out time. Inequation (A14) 
specifies the range of the SOC. Equation (A15) requires that the SOC at the end of the considered time horizon should be equal to that at the beginning 
of the horizon, ensuring that the scheduling can keep going beyond the current scheduling horizon. Equations (A16) and (A17) presents the upper 
limits of charging and discharging power, in which the charging power is denoted as positive while the discharging power is negative. It is worth 
noting that in the formulation composed of Equations (A12)-(A17), the electric vehicle just leaves home once. Nevertheless, this will not lose any 
generality, because it is straightforward to model the situations where the electric vehicle leaves/returns home several times, by adding more formulas 
that are similar to Equation (A13). It is also worth noting that in Equations (A12)–(A17), it is assumed that tout < tin, but it is straightforward how to 
formulate the situations where tout > tin, so it is not presented in the paper. 
Note that the optimization problem formulated by Equations (A1)–(A17) can be transformed as an equivalent mixed integer linear programming 
(MILP) problem, and thus can be solved by off-the-shelf optimization tools. 
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